

Cause of America – Research Roundtable January 11, 2023 TRANSCRIPT

ASG: Welcome everybody. Today is Wednesday, January 11th, 2023 and this is our first research roundtable of the year. And I know you guys love technical topics so I brought everyone's favorite technical Colonel, Colonel Shawn Smith. I asked Shawn to speak and he said, what would you like me to talk about? I said YES. Whatever technical topic you want, because we're due for a technical topic, so everybody's ready. So. Take it away, Shawn.

SS: So I thought maybe we could talk about one or two things that came to mind because they're very timely and I think they affect a lot of jurisdictions and the so the issues are really important. Both of them are sort of related to Arizona, but they have applications in lots of other places. So let me just open up the question. I thought the two things that we could talk about would either try to do a little bit of a deep dive on Runbeck as an example but also as one of the largest printers of ballots in the country that prints mail in ballots or automated signature verification which Runbeck is involved in. And I thought we could talk about some of the issues involved in automatic signature verification and why, and nobody should be using it, and why everything we've been told about it is a farce and a lie. Or we could talk about kind of a combination of those. Does anybody have a preference? Anybody want to chime in with something timely? I think this affects a lot of places. This is being pushed by NASA and EAC as something viable. And also it's part of that. I want to talk about this whole paper shortage idea that is being pimped repeatedly, kind of like climate alarmism, so any thoughts or preferences from the forum?

ASG: I don't know, Shawn. You think you can fill an hour and a half just talking about these? I think we might need a Part 2 and a part three.

SS: Really. Yeah. There's also going to be information that people have in their own states like— what happens usually is you start talking about these things. This happens with forensic groups. You know, you start talking and we can talk about some of the specifics of what's happened in Maricopa and what the. I don't even know what to say. Yesterday I went to Elbert County, Colorado and watched a couple real public servants get sworn in for their terms as Commissioner and clerk. And the judge who swore them in is the same judge who ruled against that Commissioner when he was the county clerk there and forced him to turn over the copies of election records he had made to the Secretary of State who destroyed all the other copies of election records. And we're finding this kind of I don't know what to call it, judicial malpractice, corruption. I don't know what to call it but anyway some of a lot of these issues came up there with signature verification and you know what's true. And so watching what happened in Maricopa and what that judge in the first Lake v. Hobbs case and then the latest judge. And just watching them consider sanctions after they have ruled so, just spectacularly ineptly, which is charitable in those cases. But I thought we could talk about some of what happened in Maricopa, the evidence that was presented, the difference between, you know, what we were told in the media, that kind of narrative that was that was pimped by the media about how

Runbeck helped Maricopa save the day, and then what's actually true based on the evidence that we could see there in Maricopa. I guess I should just launch in unless there's somebody else with somebody's got their hand up, Laura in Iowa?

LAURA: Hi Shawn. Thank you everybody for being here. Happy New year. Yeah, I agree with we have a hot mess with the signature verification here in Iowa. There is a mark. They tell us that there is a mark on the line. You can't compare signature. They use the explanation as we are not trained signature verification verifiers. Therefore, if there's a mark, it's good. If there's not a mark, then there's no signature, that's it. And so that's a hot mess. So how where do we go from there?

SS: Right. There's all kinds of people all over the United States who have jobs where they have to verify signatures every day and they're not trained in signature verification. So it's just ridiculous. They set us up for this. So yeah, it's a great topic. All of it is. Thank you. Let me find the original, a ballot envelope signature. I was trying to figure out how so many signatures were accepted. And then I started researching the signature verification process because sometimes people don't believe me or understand the magnitude of my ignorance. When I started this whole process, I didn't know how anything happened. I didn't know how they did anything in the election process. I only knew you marked your ballot. And then they counted it with integrity and accurately, and everybody got their ballot. Once after their identity was verified and they submitted their cast ballot. And all of that was of course wrong. But so I started looking at the signature process and normally when you see a signature affidavit on the mail in ballot envelope which is typically where it is and sometimes it's inside a security envelope so that those are protected. But a lot of states are increasingly not using any kind of security envelope and the signature is exposed, which means that when the ballots go through mail processing, they're scanned by the Postal Service.

So the Postal Service scans all first class mail and all election related mail and because they do that, because most ballot envelopes that are being sent out and returned for mail in and early ballots have an intelligent mail barcode on it, well that IMB that intelligent mail barcode which is the weird looking multi height barcode on the outside of mail, that correlates to a specific customer, including routing information, origin and destination information. And metadata for that, for that mail piece and for all of those mail pieces and all of that metadata plus the images are available and typically forwarded to the customer, that is the owner per se of the Intelligent mail barcode.

So for example, let's pick a state like Washington state, they may have IMB's that correlate to the Secretary of State's office for the mail going out and to a specific county for the mail coming back in. And then they are signed up as the owner and I'm trying to remember the name of the of the process owner, but basically they own the account within U.S. Postal service's mail track and report. It's track and report MTR. And so they get data that tells them the status of every mail piece, where it was last scanned, where it's on its way to and where it originated, and they get those images when the mail pieces are scanned if they want them. They can also designate proxies so when you see a service like ballot tracks, they are getting proxy data from the Postal

Service on the status of those mail pieces, it's also typically interfaced with the statewide voter registration system. So when voters are getting texts or emails saying your ballot has been printed, your ballot has been mailed, your ballot has been counted, well when they're told their ballot has been received, accepted or counted, there's no way for there to be an interface between the ballot being counted and that notification system unless they are violating the law. So what they're really doing is saying that they've received the piece, and then they're telling voters that their ballot has been counted. So they're giving them kind of a false assurance. But what's new?

Let me share my screen. I want to show you something. So I've found in no state where mail-in ballots are used, in the affidavit, signatures are used for verification of the identity. In no state are judges who are looking at those manually being given the instruments to see what they should be able to see. So not in every state, but in almost every state, it's illegal to have a machine or another individual that says that the voter themselves must sign the affidavit, right? Typically when we have someplace where there's notary that's required or something like that, they have to make a special provision to specifically and explicitly allow for the use of electronic signatures. A printed signature printed by a machine including an inkjet printer, except in cases typically where the individual is somehow disabled or differently and enabled, or whatever the correct politically correct term is, except in those cases, they are not supposed to be using any kind of machine for the signature. So if you find an inkjet printed signature it is evidence, prima facia, of an illegal unacceptable affidavit and therefore the ballot should be not be counted. But no jurisdiction anywhere is checking for this.

It means that because we give companies like Runbeck not only the ballot formats and the information to put on the mailing envelopes for early and mail in ballots, but also access to the voter information, because when they're running an automatic signature verification machine by default, in order to be able to compare the signatures on envelopes to the signatures and the database, they have to have access to the database, which means they have access to the signatures to begin with. So let me do the math here. One company has ballot formats, and by the way, they can print test checks, and they do, which means they can print marked ballots. They also have systems that are used for ballot duplication, like if you have UOCAVA overseas voters or if they have spoiled ballots, they can duplicate a ballot, meaning they can print a ballot with vote choices marked. And they even have a system to print the marks so that the marks don't look artificial. In other words, they have a library of images and so does Dominion and so does ES&S. They have a library of ballot mark images that look like handwritten or hand marked ballot marks. To the naked eye they look like they've been made by hand with a pen and they can use their printers to print these.

So let me go back to Runbeck now. Runbeck has printers which print ballots, ballot envelopes, ballot marks, and they have access to all the signatures for many jurisdictions, sometimes entire states, which they can also print on the outside of ballot envelopes. So Runbeck--one single company--has every single piece of information it needs to print a marked ballot for any voter in some States and jurisdictions, and then to deposit that into the postal system so that it gets delivered directly to a county or jurisdiction which will receive it as if it has come from a voter.

So now imagine that you have voting history files that tell you whether a voter who is registered is active, whether they have voted, and whether or not they have voted. So in other words, every single voter that you could prospectively cast a ballot, or whether they're likely to go and cast your ballot in a given election, you have a potential likelihood. This is a whole other aspect if you have propagated the voter rolls and inflated the voter rolls with voter names which are effectively personas like they have for bot farming. So these don't have to be real people who live in that state. They could be the names from another state that have been washed, laundered through, for example, ERIC, and then injected into a state voter rolls, which helps explain why you had, for example in Colorado between 2016 and 2018, three times as many new active voter registrations as you had an increase in state population, and from 18 to 20 you had four times as many as new population growth in the state. It's not possible. It's not possible to do that because the typical assumption is about 80% of new population is going to be eligible voting age population because you have some percentage with children, some which are, you know, felons, some which are non-citizens, some which are registered in other states, some which are disabled somehow under guardianship or whatever. And so to have 100% of your new eligible population appear on your voter rolls would be an extraordinary and I suspect they have 200% which would be ridiculous. 300% is crime, right? It's crime.

When your percentages of voting population increased systematically in exceedance of your population growth, and then you have similarly the percentages of turnout of active voters staying the same or even going up, you know something's wrong. Well, this is how you could do that. I don't know for sure this is what's being done. You could also have people hand marking ballots that are fake but or that they are not eligible voters and in other people's names. But anyway, this is one way you could do it.

So this is what I want to show you--what it would look like, the difference between a wet ink signature and an inkjet printed signature., if our election judges had instruments which they should have. You couldn't go into a court and have an expert witness testify as to the authenticity of a signature unless that expert witness was an actual expert, they would have to be someone. If they're credentialed question document examiner, they have typically a bachelor's degree and a science, frequently a physical science. They have typically at least six months of experience underneath the supervision of a credentialed expert in the field. They have to have passed tests and demonstrated that they have a certain amount of knowledge. And the more typical training requirements and experience requirements are a year of training and two years of experience before they would be considered an expert that you would want to cite and use in a court case for signature verification. So let me show you what these look like. So first of all I'm going to show you a wet signature. Let me see if I can share my screen. OK, so this happens to be a loop out of one letter in my signature. And I'm going to zoom in. Can you see it zooming in? OK, good. So this is 1 loop. Now remember on an affidavit signature, it's typically about half an inch. It's the height that limits the size of the signatures on affidavits for ballot envelopes, it's typically about half an inch. In height, that's about a little bit less than the size of a dime. Keep in mind here, you're looking at a 45x magnification image of a wet ink signature on paper that I scanned at very high resolution and high color. And now you're

looking at it at about 10 times the size that you would be able to see it. As if you were a signature verification judge working in a voting center. Now I'm gonna zoom it in to what you can see if you look at it full screen. So you can start to see now the pixelation and these are artifacts of the scanning originally, not of the wet ink signature itself, but I want you to just look and see. I'm gonna zoom in a lot here, apologize. Like when a dog gets right in your face. That's what my dogs do all the time you have. So you have variants of color here, but it's relatively fluid. You can see there's a harder line on the outside that's an artifact. There's same thing here. That's an artifact of the pen itself. But you see tonal variations from lighter leads to darker, but it looks pretty continuous. Now I want to show you the same exact magnification and scan for an inkjet printed signature and watch what happens when you look at it. Do you see the pixelation? Inside you see lighter variants, you can see now color artifacts. It's a much different appearance at high magnification. Now this is just 45 magnification, which is very easy to do. These are cheap instruments. Now I'm going to show you what 140 looks like. So this is a wet ink signature at 140 times magnification. This is very easy to do. You could have handheld devices. You could be doing this with an instrument that automates it.

ASG: This is a looks like a Monet.

SS: Yeah, it does, right. And that's interesting that you say that because Monet used brushes for ink, right. He used brushes for probably oil painting or maybe acrylic or watercolor, I guess mostly that's an oil. Back then he did a lot of watercolor. But he used brushes and so when it's a natural analog created line it's they're color variations, but it's not like that there are repeatable, predictable different colors in it. That color has been mixed, and that's the same with ink and pens. But now look at what an inkjet looks like under high magnification. Do you see the stark color variations, including the red and the yellow? Hmm. So you start to see these white spots that you did not see. And when you're at a more significant scanning like it's impossible to miss the inkjet artifacts and these because it's spraying individual droplets under the page. If you see individual yellow, this is the same exact color that has been scanned and then printed with the inkjet. But the way the inkjet reproduces that color of the original ink signature is by spraying a combination of different colored droplets and a high magnification. You cannot miss the difference between these different colored droplets. So again, let me take away and look at that. Wet ink. See, they're all tonal variations of the same mixed color. But when you look at the sprayed inkjet, you see the color droplet variations.

ASG: Shawn, those are both at 140x magnification? Do you see a difference with the inkjet at 45x or does it have to be at that 140x to see the difference?

SS: So this is wet. This is the actual signature scan and this is, this is the wet again at higher magnification. And then this is the inkjet. So you can see the white spots in here that you do not see. That's at 45.

ASG: Oh, yeah. So you definitely can see at 45.

SS: OK, yeah. So it's clearer at 140x but even at 45 you can see the difference with the color variations. I call them interstitials because there are these spaces in between those white space dots like this. Like my cursor is right over this white dot, and then the flecks of red and the flecks of yellow and the overspray pattern too. Yeah, that's what I was going to say. It's all past the actual loop. It's all over exactly. Whereas in the same magnification of wet, it does not have the same appearance at the borders. Like, you can look at these two and you can see. So a machine detecting these things would be child's play, right? Because it's already trying to scan it at higher resolution. The other problem here with signature verification of course, is that now so many states are capturing signatures from wherever they get them. You have them in these unsecured voter registration databases that have no certification standards whatsoever, no testing standards. There's a federal statute under HAVA that requires that the voter registration systems be secure and accurate. It is the law. But there is no enforcement mechanism whatsoever. There is no body enforcing it. There is no standard enforce of enforcement. There is nobody following up on it. It is essentially a blank check for inaccurate and unsecure voter rolls in states, and that's what we have. And we've proven that repeatedly in multiple states through canvassing. But part of that insecurity isn't just whether the individuals should be on there or their information is accurate. It is that the databases of signatures. Are completely and totally unreliable. We have no idea. And no way of verifying as citizens whether the signatures in the database actually pertain to and are accurate for the voters that are listed, let alone where they've come from.

So if I've got access to that voter registration system, I can inject whatever I want. If I want to have my dog's paw print be the signature that's verifiable for the Secretary of State of Colorado, I can do it. It's just an image. And then you have also all of these signature captures occurring at different state agencies with no verification really of the identity. So again in states like Colorado, Nebraska, I think this is true in about 34 states, the signature or the identity verification requirements for citizens are so weak they might as well not exist. So if you can verify that you are a particular voter with a utility bill and the public official has no way to verify that the utility bill is authentic, then it's a fake ID, right? It's a fake ID as much as the McLovin fake ID was for the guy in the movie "Superbad." It's completely and totally ludicrous. It's useless. So it's not just a utility bill, it's a canceled check. Again, they have no way of verifying that it's an authentic check. They don't even verify that the bank exists or that the government agency exists, let alone that that particular check is authentic or that the individual on it is authentic. Then you have certificate of Indian blood. I was trying to make a point and I made a certificate of percentage of Indian blood for the Secretary of State and made her 100% Inuit in a briefing that we gave in 2021. And it shocked some of the legislators. But it didn't change anything, right? They didn't go back and try to change anything. I handed one pretty senior state government official, I think he was the attorney general or the Secretary of State. I think he was the Attorney general of a state. I handed him a utility bill for him that I had made-up that would have allowed me to vote for him in their elections. And he thought I was joking. He had to pull up his own statue and verify it. And he verified it. And then he was, you know, looked kind of sheepish about it.

But anyway, so you have, we have this witches brew of an unsecure system, weak ID that can be just totally fabricated. And then this verification process, and this is the basis of us accepting ballots in our elections. Then we have the additional problem of companies like Runbeck. They do these dog and pony interviews with him and EAC officials where they're talking about, for example, election officials, you know, preparing themselves for the paper shortage. So the very same people who have pushed early and mail in voting, which involves the use of massive amounts of paper for the envelopes because you have two envelopes. Imagine now if we just printed ballots for Election Day. The difference between that paper supply requirement and the paper supply requirement to put an envelope around that ballot on the way out and on the way back it, it literally triples the amount of paper that's being used.

ASG: At least triples, right? Because I know in Colorado, there's also an instruction form that is like an 11 by 14 folded in half, printed front and back that goes out with it too.

SS: Yeah and it's the blue books, too. You can register to vote online, but you can't look up the information for all the ballot issues and races online. So they have to send out a like 50 page packet to everybody. It's ridiculous. But anyway, so, so this is our problem then. Now we get to the automatic signature. So judges at least, at least with judges you would assume reasonably some of them are going to be honest people, right. Some of them are your neighbors, some of them are normal citizens trying to do their duty. They probably think they're doing something good, right? They think that they're being diligent. They're looking at the signature. They're making sure it matches the signature in the system. What they don't understand and aren't told is that there's no security verification or, you know, confidence that anyone should have in the signatures in the system, that they're looking at them without instruments. And because they're all amateurs, they don't even know the difference, right? It's like if you ever come on somebody and they're trying to change a tire and they use the wrong tool, but they don't know it. That's what our signature verification judges are doing.

But most of our signatures in our largest counties, which are determining the outcomes of elections in our states, like in Arizona, no county matters but Maricopa, it's so large compared to all the other counties. In Colorado, what county matters other than, you know, El Paso, Denver, Boulder, Jefferson, Pueblo at the low end, Mesa down at the low end, Laramie, Adams, Arapahoe and Jefferson. In some states, one county is completely determinative. Like you know Los Angeles County in California is larger than all but I think maybe like 18 states' populations. Then you have San Bernardino County. You have massive counties in Georgia, massive counties in Texas, in Florida, all the largest counties are using automatic signature verification. There is no certification or testing standards whatsoever for the automatic. Picture verification machines. Most of them, including all of the Runbeck machines, are connected to public networks to get back to Runbeck, and also to get access to the voter information and signature databases that they use for the comparison. And if they're connected externally and there's no independent security or certification on them, which if they even had it, it would be like the voting systems, probably, which is a total farce. It's totally incompetent. If they had a security system and certification system, it would likely be as grossly inadequate and corrupt as the one

we have for voting systems. But we don't even have that. We have nothing whatsoever. There is no independent oversight or control over these systems at all.

The political affiliations of those companies, executives and staff becomes hypercritical because they're completely partisan. If they're not completely honest, they are controlling our election outcomes. It doesn't matter who sends a ballot in, doesn't matter who's in the voting center. It matters who can print a ballot and print a ballot signature, and who can control the authentication of them. So now you consider what happened in Los Angeles County when the citizens tried to recall District Attorney Gascon. They tried to recall him and they had, I want to say it was 30%, the highest number of any petition in history on record. 30% of signatures were rejected, which brought them down just below the threshold they would need to have a ballot petition measure make it to the ballot for recall of Gascon. Now the critical importance of the signature verification process and the role of these companies becomes evident. We could specify an entire regime of processes for testing and certification and verification and monitoring and auditing of the automatic signature verification machines. But you would still have the problems of identity and the voter registration databases. So now it's one more reason why when we recommend clean voter rolls starting from scratch, held at the local level, controlled completely at the county or parish, with read only copies given to states for deconfliction and verification internal to the state and external to the state and Election Day voting in person with a government photo issued photo ID. And then hand counting paper ballots.

Now the reason becomes clear because the amount of resources it would take, like there's over 3000 counties in the United States. If every one of them used voting systems, it would immediately outstrip all of the capable cybersecurity personnel we have in the US workforce, they would have to do nothing but auditing of those voting systems every election to even have a chance to know what happened on the voting systems. That leaves nobody left over. We're already short. I'd say we probably couldn't do more than 200 counties at one time if we used all the capable cyber security personnel and they were all trained, all knew the same standard and had oversight. That's what it would take just to do the voting systems. There's nobody left to do signature verification systems. There's nobody left to do the voter registration systems. We don't have that number of personnel in the United States. And then we have this impediment and obstacle of the public officials who have been brainwashed, some of them, you know, willingly, some of them with glee, people who whistled on the way into the gas chamber. But some of the they've been convinced. That this system is viable and secure. They've been told this repeatedly. These EAC Commissioners and their staff and the National Association of Secretary of the State and election directors and then the institutions like CTCL. So Pam Anderson's you know, mothership and then and then you have the lawfare people who are suing anybody who questions, trying to get lawyers disbarred. Look at the lawyers involved and the people involved in Maricopa and the first Lake vs. Hobbs case. Stanley Tucci, that judge was formerly with Bane and Brown. Bane and Brown became Perkins Coie. He never disclosed that conflict of interest. Perkins Coie, chair of their nationwide firm-wide Committee, was a junior associate alongside Tucci at Brown and Bain or Bain and Brown. These people are all tight with each other. The coppersmith, Brockelman people are all involved in the same process, was an

associate at Perkins Coie and then became Arizona's election director with no prior election experience and now is with States United, which are the people who are the outside counsel supporting Hobbs in all of these cases, trying to defeat election integrity measures from candidates and citizens. So anyway, so that's our environment. I'm confident we will never have a trustworthy election with these systems because we don't have the resources nationally. We don't have the resources if we did, if we stopped defending defense systems, financial systems, and other national security systems and did nothing but try to secure these electronic voter registration, signature verification, and voting systems, we still couldn't do it. And we wouldn't. We'd be defenseless against everything else. So let me stop there.

Based on that, I have no confidence in Runbeck. I've been to their facility in Phoenix, I've seen their facility. It's a weird looking place for a paper company. They've got you know, secure walls, relatively secure. They're not like really high or anything, but all the way around they try to block the view so you can't see shipments going in and out. They don't even have a sign up that says they're Runbeck. They've got cameras on the entrances. They've got another facility. Tempe, they've got other facilities in other states, like they had one in Colorado up until the 3rd November 2020. It was an industrial park on the western edge of Denver and then it disappeared. So I don't know what they're doing. I don't trust them at all. They say stuff that's just nonsense. They were part of the Maricopa cover up in this last election. They came out and said Ohh, we helped him figure it out. Thank you. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors thanks to Runbeck for all their help and identifying the problem with the fusers, which was the real problem with the ballots, it wasn't the real problem with the ballots. More ballots were rejected because they changed printer settings on the ballot on-demand printers and printed a 20 inch ballot image in a 19 inch space on 20 inch paper. That caused misfeeds galore with the ICP printers and there's a or the ICP scanners in the voting centers and there's a lot more going to come out about that in the next filing. They're trying to go to the Supreme Court in the Arizona with that case, the one that was just dismissed with the second Lake vs. Hobbs.

I could go into more detail, but let me open it up for questions and other comments because I think there's a lot of experience now with the community of citizens in terms of these issues and what you're seeing in different states. So let me just stop talking and see who's got what questions and comments.

ASG: OK, perfect. And I can't help thinking that listening to you it sounds so similar to the dropbox situation. Where it's like no, we have this safeguard in place. They're under surveillance, but the artifacts on the videos are terrible. No one is watching it and you can't do anything. Even when evidence is brought forth: look the same person showed up over and over and over like we saw in 2000 mules. Well, you can't prove it. So it's all these placebos to soothe the public that it's safer.

SS: It's not the statute in Arizona. What is it, 16? I think it's 16503. So the statutes in Arizona, Arizona revised statute requires it's the law, right? This is the will of the legislature expressing the time, place and manner restrictions required by Article 1, Section 4, in the Constitution, the legislature prescribed the time, place, and manner of voting. It requires county boards of

supervisors to have their ballots for an election printed and available in for inspection 10 days in advance. It's the law. And what did they do in the vote centers? They relied upon ballot on-demand printers to print for all those people voting in person. It was illegal. It was, on the face of it, illegal. It's a felony, literally a felony. Nobody's doing anything with it. The sheriffs aren't doing anything with it. The Attorney general isn't doing anything with it. This is across the country. We're seeing this, that the officials are violating the law rampantly. I mean, it's flagrant. So anyway, I said stop. Let me stop.

ASG: That's OK because I kept you going there. So David in Washington has been very patient. Go ahead, David.

DAVID: Hi, everyone. Shawn, you're spot on, we've got everything that you have mentioned and then some. My particular county we actually run the Agilis and my auditor is chomping at the bit to activate the signature verification. Uh, one thing that Shawn didn't touch on is on these signature verifications, they're adjustable. You can set the tolerance to where scribble counts as a signature. We've had an array of discrepancies from county to county with some of our counties having up to 10,000 signatures that were kicked out down to as low as a few 100. So we we've got some major problems. One thing that we do and have said from the very beginning is if you want to know what's coming to your state, simply look to Washington state and you'll see what's coming down. It's odd that you did mention Perkins Coie. Perkins Coie is currently in Washington state. We have an investigation. They have avoided our public requests, a bunch of data from all 39 of our counties. We also have a case running simultaneously on that there is bias in the signature verification and Perkins Coie is in Washington state as we speak trying to do away with signature verification because it's racist. This is a huge, huge problem that we're trying to at least get some input on and some addressing of. But like this Agilis system, these aren't cheap. These are \$500,000 machines.

The other avenue that I wanted to kind of bring to your attention to is your Postal Service. It's a little dirty secret that within our United States Postal Service we have a subsection that is only elections. They have their own postmaster general. They have their own sections that are secure, roped off chain link, fenced off with their own staff, that the normal postal workers do not cross that barrier. We have discovered this here in Washington state and verified it with whistleblowers. They have their own machinery. Washington State is one of those lovely states where we have our signature on the outside of the ballot. So the Postal Service and then we have identified that Runbeck is tied in with your voter rolls and through the ERIC database with the Postal Service, what Shawn was saying about being able to duplicate your ballot is child's play for them.

ASG: Awesome. Did you have any question for Shawn or did you just want to share that?

SS: That's perfect, David. I just want to add to what he said about the settings. So they use Runbeck actually it's another Colorado product. It's funny I always say this and it's true. Everybody says their state is the worst for election integrity and they're all 100% right. It's like reverse Lake Wobegon, but Colorado has also unfortunately been the exporter. So the

software, the algorithms, the approach to verification of signatures that's used by Runbeck for signature verification is produced by Paris script, which is a Colorado company. I can't remember if they're Thornton or Wheat Ridge, but it's theoretically it's used for check signature verification. The problem is you can pick like a thumbprint. You know when if you ever look at thumbprint for biometric, you put your thumbprint down or you swipe it in the software is comparing a specified number of points there are spatial location. If you took the signatures on a pressure sensitive pad, you would have probably four times as much information to do signature verification on because they would be able to determine not just slant, stroke and relationship, but also the pressure at each point in the signature and you have a distinct pressure on your signature. So if they were doing that on a really high quality digital signature capture pad, you'd have that information, but that's not the case and it's the same with their signatures. Some of them are fuzzy. So you can change not only the number of points of comparison and if you pick just one or two points of comparison, if it's like it picks a pixel in the middle and there's something filled in, it matches. You can also change gamma, contrast and brightness settings for those scans. And each one of those has the perspective to increase or reduce the difficulty.

So now imagine if I was like a hyper partisan conservative, and I was responsible for controlling those machine settings. Or I could do it remotely, because I worked at Runbeck and I have a real time connection to the system all the time, and I changed it so that any ballot coming out of particular precinct which happened to be heavily democratic or heavily independent would have much higher, more severe standards for signature verification than any ballot somewhere else. There'd be no record of it. Nobody looks at the logs, nobody checks the configurations, nobody is controlling this from a government perspective, or verifying it from an independent perspective. So what David mentioned is super critical. These machines are wide open.

DAVID: Bless you. Thank you. One other thing that you mentioned was this ability of the Runbecks to actually fill in the blanks and they have duplicated different types of filling in the little circles. That actually, I personally have seen the script and the page where that shows up and this was on the administrative laptops when we were doing my secretary or my auditor and the team, they like me but they fear me and so they have given me when I asked a few times to actually go in and witness things I got to go see. The machine count, which was an absolute joke, um, don't get me started on that. But this was what they called the merge machine recount on a Commissioners race where there was only 33 votes separating them as they were going through bringing up the votes. And all they did on this machine recount is count the undervotes, the overvotes, and the write ins. They didn't actually count the votes for the candidates. And I was sitting literally 3 feet behind her when they were going through this. All of a sudden the screen popped up at the top of the monitor and it had probably, I imagine there was 60-80 little circles. And it started from a very dark, complete down to just kind of like somebody skimmed over it a little bit. And I called her and I said, what's that? She goes, Oh well, that's a determining of the scoring of the ballot marking. And I said, well, I've never heard of such a thing. That she goes well yeah the machines actually have the ability and in the batches they go through and can actually score a filling in of the bubble and the way it looked like if you open up like word or one of the these where you have all of the command center

across the top where you can click and set parameters on a document. Exactly the same type of a setup. Um, and my feeling that you literally could have gone up, clicked on one of these, carried it down, and put it on a ballot is the way it appeared to me.

SS: Well, a couple graduate students at University of Michigan working under Halderman actually demonstrated that they could run a very simple script, a software program that would copy ballot marks, that they could basically take a snapshot if you will, a ballot marks on a ballot image in real time as the ballots were being scanned and then reproduced that ballot mark in a different location, and that there was sufficient information for the for the software to do it automatically. In other words, it would be indistinguishable to the naked eye, the final image that was retained in the machine as the ballot record. So the ballot record in a machine is the ballot image plus any scan or tabulation of the vote marks. That's correlated to the kind of map of that ballot image. And together those plus the log records that prove when it was happened or try to prove when it was happened or correlate, that's all supposed to be part of the ballot record. So they showed that that could be done in real time as ballots are being scanned. There is no protection whatsoever on the scanning. Tabulating machines? None that can be done. It's been demonstrated years ago. You can find it. We've got the link. I think Amy may even have it in the library.

ASG: Yeah, I'm pretty sure I do. I think if you search vulnerabilities it should show up. All right. So next up we have George. Go ahead, George.

GEORGE: Thank you, Amy. It's a pleasure that you bring this together for us. Shawn, I'm in Illinois and we've got a basic system of voter registration and then the E poll books. The poll books are much more accessible because they're not certified or even registered with the state. Now within their E poll books, the voter signatures are resident. They're not resident in the voter registration rolls. And what they do is they attach the voter ID, the specific ID for the state, go to the DMV and drop down a voter signature with a new coming or they attach it to the ePollbook as a person signs up and registers. Now my concern is, there's very little access to the voting system. There's a hell of a lot of access to the E poll books, and we're trying to figure out ways to be able to tie it across the two together. Now, one of the things that we've found was back in August of 2020, 20,000 voters' drivers license ID's with signatures, addresses, names and all that were confiscated by the border. The inspection people looking at the things coming in from China, they found 20,000 of them. Now my concern is if someone has access to this epollbooks, they can put all that information right up into it already for anybody to print a driver's license with a signature. It's got all that data already compiled someplace. And so it's just a matter of uploading that information possibly for a short period of time such as three weeks before the election and then removing it three weeks after election. So we don't monitor the E poll books and we're trying to work with our county to be able to get into that process this we're concerned that that, and along with the mailing addresses, these voter registration requires a 5-digit ZIP code. The ballot tracking process requires a 9-digit ZIP code, and there's some concerns that they the last four digits could be modified to go to a drop location. So we went with the postal inspector and talked to them about some of the information. And the postal inspector said that basically the delivered point is the central processing which is like a

central distribution center. It packages it for the local post offices. Now certain packages go to the mail route where they're sorted, other packages go to PO boxes and or businesses where they're not sorted. So the whole stack is basically delivered without looking at the addresses. So our concern is more the poll books here in Illinois. The other thing is we're fighting is the state of Illinois is starting to put together legislation for automatic signature verifications. They've already started backtracking on dual party signature verification on the outer ballot to, as may be, an appointed election official. Which is going against the grain of having two people looking at it. Right now, technically one person appointed by the Election Commission can verify signatures coming through on the ballots on the outside.

The constitutional attorney who ran for attorney general in the primary a week and a half ago filed a suit in Will County is basically him and a couple of mathematicians come across an algorithm in one race. This algorithm they were able to determine that the number of people that voted on Election Day versus the early vote and the vote by mail and you put in a certain number and you can predict the precinct coming out when they were able to predict every single precinct within like I think it was like .02%. And that because that .02% represented the provincial ballots and or the cure ballots that came in that they had to be cured after the fact that the other ones going in. We are not alleging an algorithm. What we're alleging is it's mathematically impossible for someone to predict the outcome of every single precinct for the county clerk and be able to be within that accurate. That's just a heads up. We're hoping something goes that way. They've decided to stay away from admitting there was an algorithm, but rather saying that there's a mathematical and probability and that the voting system people have to explain this. That's my update in Illinois.

SS: Yeah that's exactly right George. It should be an entering argument where a rational judge says this has to be audited independently when you find that kind of a pattern. I also want to say something about the about the poll books, electronic poll books are they are a fox in the chicken coop. I don't know if there's any chickens in the chicken coop in our voting centers and precincts but there are a lot of sheep for sure. Yeah. So when you look at the poll books and we could talk about Robis, the company's name is Robis, it's "rob us." Right. Knowink, ES&S, ePollbooks, they're all the same. They usually use tablets or laptops. 100% of the tablets and about 99% of the laptops have integrated hardwired wireless connectivity. You have just introduced a wireless networking connection into the voting center and put it next to typically voting systems, the tablets. In laptops are almost 100% manufactured overseas, mostly in China. And then you see with the with the Einstein and with the CIS's you know, security system that they have put in to monitor, which began with Einstein, that they're using these cradle point routers which are Internet of Things routers all running on Firstnet, which is an unmonitored, able segregated wireless bandwidth used only for first responders. They're only supposed to be used for first responders controlled by AT&T and the Firstnet public private partnership. So just like with ERIC, just like with CIS, FirstNet, by creating this public private partnership, they have firewalled public scrutiny of what they're doing and what they have and they do it underneath the rubric of this is critical infrastructure, you know, the designation of election infrastructures as critical infrastructure in 2017. It has no advantages for Americans whatsoever. It only obscures access to information.

So back to the poll books. I don't trust any of the poll books. We should not be using electronic poll books connected to anything or connectable to anything. I wouldn't have a problem with a clerk using a computer system that was completely self-contained within their voting center, but it would be an extraordinarily difficult task. Much harder than just printing off paper voter rolls, so. Anyway, thanks George. I appreciate you talking about that. We should probably have a RR on the poll books later.

GEORGE: I agree. Yeah. I got one other question for you. Yeah. Shawn, can I ask you a question?

SS: Sure. Fire away.

GEORGE: Are you familiar with the logic and accuracy testing that's done with all the machines prior to the election?

SS: You mean the farce of logic and accuracy testing? Yes.

GEORGE: All right, I have found that in the city of Chicago, on Election Day, they fire up their tabulators and put a modem on there and they download a file. And I was wondering if this violates their logic and accuracy testing because they've now downloaded another file into the system that would change whatever the system is doing. You know, if there's a strict requirement that once the logic and accuracy testing is done that nothing can be done until after the election.

SS: I'll have to look at the Illinois statute logically. So the election administrators are, and I mean this without any denigration at all, wildly, wildly ignorant about cyber, right? So they are among the most ignorant people in the country about cyber tech and security. They have no idea what they're downloading. They open that system up. It can, it can be, you know, they can be told it's anything. For example, Dominion voting systems down in Maricopa have language loaded on them for the audio files. It's a QM file for the Keras language. The problem with that is twofold. One, their software doesn't use QM files for their audio. That's not what's cepstral voices uses, it uses an entirely different kind of file structure. And the second problem is Keras is a language spoken only by the Kerasene people who live only in New Mexico. It's an indigenous population, tribal population, and they don't have any in Arizona. But nobody there ever questions any of that, nobody questions any of this anywhere from the election administration standpoint. They don't have the expertise and they don't have the will. So yeah, they shouldn't be downloading anything into any system. It shouldn't be open or connected to any outside network. They have no ability to protect it. The fact that they allow it shows you either how corrupt or ignorant they are.

GEORGE: Yeah, it's not attached to a network, it's attached to a phone modem. They actually in their instructions to the tabulator operators it says to plug it in. They're setting it up, and then after it goes through the self check and does a printing of the zero run, the modem then kicks

in, brings in a file and downloads that file into the same location that they looks like the same location that they did on the logic and accuracy testing when they did that.

SS: Yeah, that'd be like, I don't know if anybody's ever canned food, you know, with Mason jars, but that'd be like canning food, sealing it up, and then opening the top to stick your finger in to see if it was sealed up. It's like Talladega Nights, you just ruined everything, right? If you open it up, there's no security at all. You have no idea what's been done. Two seconds and you can download a file or command that radically changes the configuration, security, and performance and function of that system. It's a complex computer system. It takes no time at all; one connection and it's done. I'll look at the statute.

GEORGE: OK. Thank you for your help.

ASG: Thanks, George. All right, Shawn, we have some questions, comments, etc. in the chat. Erica said Perkins Coie filed the court case about signature verification here in Washington. Laurie in Texas posted a link about Supreme Court rules unanimously may sue government agents for damages when they violate your individual rights. Let us know how that goes. Doug in Montana said the excuse used to rely on machines is convenience. We must begin to focus on removing all third party from our election process. I do agree, Shawn. I think having a whole Research Roundtable on E pollBooks would be excellent and very beneficial. Burrell says can E poll book data be used to insert illegal ballots. Hence, if there is a network connection to identify votes cast by registered party, then potential to insert ballots for those who registered and did not vote.

SS: Yeah, 100%. So there's a great debate taking place right now. We've told people repeatedly, do not vote early, do not vote by mail, vote in person and do it on Election Day. Well, they had the catastrophe in Maricopa, which was I think, a designed intentional catastrophe. And so now a lot of people, including people I really respect and like, like Dan Bongino, are propagating the idea that everybody should-- you know Scott Pressler's talked about well we're gonna out ballot harvest them. No, you're not. You cannot out print corrupt people. So you may be out trying to collect legitimate votes from legitimate voters. You're working on turnout and engagement and getting them involved and you're going to get the troops rallied and you're going to go collect. You know you could have 100% of conservative and independent voters all cast their votes all vote responsibly for whatever they want. But I think limited government, obviously constitutional government and still at an industrial park 4 minutes away from a voting center or the central count facility. You can have industrial presses and the envelope, you know, folders and the printers afterwards with access to the voter registration database, looking to see who has voted and who is unlikely to vote in printing out for every ballot you collect they can print 10. You cannot out print corrupt people. You have to end the pot without breaking the law, right? No, you have to. You have to end the possibility of people being able to inject fraudulent votes and ballots and voters into the process and counts. The only way we do that is by getting rid of the machines because we don't have the resources nationally to supervise and audit them and they're not secure to begin with and they can't be made secure. So, so yeah, there's 100% and that's what we're concerned with. I go back to like Ballottrax and IV MTR. That's what

it's called, the USBS IVMTR when you have that feedback about who has received a ballot. Which has been undeliverable, which have been returned. You have a 90 to 94-95% probability of being able to accurately predict and model just from those, your voter turnout and votes for top line races. So if you're trying to control or determine the outcome of an election, all you need to know is what are coming in and it's like being able to see the future right after these ballots arrive at the tabulation centers. You're going to know what the counts are now if you have the ability to inject fraudulent ballots or to manipulate the count. You know exactly what you have to do to do that. You know your baseline that you're starting from.

ASG: Awesome. Shawn, Edie in Massachusetts is saying in Massachusetts we don't use Runbeck. Do you know of other printing companies who do what Runbeck does?

SS: Yeah, actually there's one in Washington state and there are others. There's another one in actually Illinois has one of the printing companies, the large ballot printing companies. There's another one down in Florida, I think it's in the back of Dominion's functionality description. And then some secretaries of state have approved lists based on them having been approved by particular voting system companies. You can find the lists of the printers while we're talking, I'm looking at the election statutes for Illinois. But let me pull that up because I think that's a quick one. So while we move on to the next question, I'll see if I can pull that up.

ASG: OK, awesome. Yeah, I was looking into that too. OK, so this is a question that actually a friend of mine recently asked me when she saw the post on social media about Ruth McGregor in Arizona leading the independent investigation about the printer issues in Maricopa and her question is: OK so if Maricopa appointed this Chief Justice, to see why the printers that read the ballots had trouble reading some of the ballots? Like is this all just word play? Since the printers don't read the ballots—and that's coming from somebody who's not involved in election integrity at all. And she's asking me, OK, but the printers don't read them, right? That's the scanner! So her question is, is this just another nonsense "investigation" or what?

SS: Well, I haven't looked into the appointment. I know she was appointed. I don't know by whom. So she's been appointed a special master, right? Let me just pull that up.

ASG: What she sent me says "former Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Ruth McGregor will lead independent investigation into Election Day printer issues." This is from Maricopa County's social media, which I think is why she didn't trust it because it was from Maricopa County. I don't know if it was Twitter or Truth Social or something else, I can't tell from what she pasted the screenshot from, but it's definitely a social media account. OK, yeah, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, Birch, announced that she was appointing the Special Master.

SS: I think I've said it before, as a former officer, I don't have the luxury of requiring any external encouragement or relying on hope. It's kind of if you lead, it's your job to generate it, not to look for it. So, I have no confidence in the judiciary at this point. So having the court appoint somebody and having them pick one of their own cloistered, you know, robed colleagues, whether she's retired or not. You get the exceptions, right? You get somebody like Gableman,

he'll just lay it out up in Wisconsin. Yeah, it kind of requires an egotist because they have to, they have to value their own sort of word over their reputation and over their status and acceptance within their community. So I don't know McGregor, I don't know what the chances are that McGregor is going to do a legitimate investigation, but we'll know when, when we see who she involves, if she asks for independent forensic experts, many of whom are the ones who've been willing to be involved. We already know the names of guys like Parikh and Dougherty and Ben Cotton and those kind of people, if she asked for them then we'll have some hope that it'll be a legitimate investigation and if she doesn't then it's probably whitewash.

ASG: OK. So we just kind of have to wait and see with that. Got it.

SS: Yeah, we'll know soon enough. So the Lake v. Hobbs trial team is going to press to go to Supreme Court and they've got a lot of more evidence to introduce. They're going to ask for independent forensic examinations.

ASG: All right. So Shawn, I see you dropped that link in the chat and Erica says K&H printers is who does it in Washington. All right. And I see Adam has a hand up. Go ahead, Adam.

ADAM: Hey, thanks for having me on. Sorry, I'm running the kids around. I haven't been able to be on the whole time. This is a little bit off topic. I'm looking for anybody in the group who has some granular data regarding SCYTL and Edison. Aggregate vote totals that are under my suspicion or getting through the Secretary of State's office and the kind of the background to this is if you if anybody has looked at these Excel spreadsheets that give the batch updates the corresponding batch percentage equals the running total percentage of each candidate. You know 30 to 60% of the time depending on the state and this is from the 2020 election. I'm bringing this forward in my county and hopefully in Florida the state, but I need to get, I guess some more data on how that feed works from the Secretary of State to SCYTL and or Edison and I'm wondering if anybody in the group has worked on this data.

ASG: I see Laurie has a hand up. Laurie, have you worked on that or did you have a different question?

LAURIE: No, but I know somebody that works on that. Todd Lindstrom in Collin County created LostVotes.us which deals the totals from the county going to the Secretary of State and how those numbers are never the same and so he'd probably be a good person to get connected with.

SS: OK, there's a data working group, Jeff Young is helping coordinate that. There's a lot of good people in it. They connect with sometimes, not all the time, but with like Jeff O'Donnell and Draza.

ADAM: Yeah, I spoke with Jeff for two hours the other night and I did get some granularity with it. If I remember from a call on here a few months ago, there was someone who had really

looked into the internal Edison process and I can't remember his name. And it seemed like he had a lot of information I can't seem to remember.

SS: Jeff Young will know those guys. But I know Jeff Young and Draza and Doc already have all looked at it because they were initially trying to use the Edison data for modeling prior to them getting access to CVR and if they can't answer your questions they'll know who's done the most work on it. I've done some research on SCYTL, but it was more about the history of the company. I mean SCYTL is effectively controlling the largest selection of software vendors in the United States. SLE is the largest selection software in use.

ADAM: And out of all the exhibits in terms of evidence, I feel like this is the most compelling and this is the reason I'm running it to ground. Just because everyone can understand it, and the fact that Edison and SCYTL match completely is just further proof that these aren't internal mechanisms that are reporting this. They have to be coming from the Secretary of State office. Even though like SCYTL puts on its website, it gathers via exit polls and stuff like that, that's a lie. They wouldn't be able to get this granularity in this exact data if that was the case, and it wouldn't match with Edison if that was the case. I think it's a compelling piece and but I need to be able to answer the mail when I bring this to the county commissioners, you know well how do you know this is valid and I have to be able to you know look at the process from A-Z to the best that I can.

SHAWN: Have you ever read "Vote Scam"?

ADAM: No, I have not.

SS: "Vote Scam" is fascinating because they talk about this issue of the reported data getting to the news and it not having an actual legitimate connection and correlation to data coming off the machines. So a lot of precincts or jurisdictions, counties for example in Colorado vote there, they upload their election results, they're unofficial results directly into clarity election night reporting. And then somehow that data is being transmogrified and becomes what is appears on the screen. But we've had documented instances where what was on the screen is not what the county is uploaded. I think it's happening a lot and counties just aren't catching it. And then you have the whole mechanism of the centralized scanning of particular ballots, like early voting where the precincts won't even know where, the vote centers won't even know about votes being attributed to them that aren't necessarily legitimate. So it's pretty clear that's being manipulated. But Vote Scam talks about how far back this goes. It was fascinating for us because I found out from Vote Scam that the League of Women Voters has been involved in the generation of fraudulent voters and voting statistics for a long, long time. I thought they just got involved recently because they were part of the lawsuit against us in Colorado where they alleged we were violating the KKK act, which is of course ludicrous and false. And we've now pretty effectively demonstrated that in court. They've been destroyed. So they're about to find out what kind of damages we're looking for their actions and we want to dissuade them from ever doing it to anybody again. But you should check out the book Vote Scam. I think you can find it almost for free, if not for free.

TODD: And just circling back, what was the name of that website one of the ladies on the call here mentioned it was? Vote switching dot US. Can you clarify that again?

LAURIE: It is lostvotes.us. And Todd, I'll put my e-mail on there, send me your e-mail and I'll make you an introduction for you.

TODD: That would be great.

LAURIE: OK, I'll put that in the chat and I'll look for your e-mail. I just dropped the link in the chat, so it's there now.

ASG: I see Edie found the Massachusetts printer: DS graphics.

EDIE: I knew that was a printer, I just didn't know if they did the same shenanigans that Runbeck does.

SS: Yeah, I don't. But I'm sure they're smaller vendors that literally just print legitimate ballots.

ASG: Their home page just says solutions and marketing, print mail fulfillment, and everything in between.

SS: Just because of the normal ballot, here's the other problem, right? And so we saw this in Maricopa with the 2020. Maricopa should have only had two types of ballot paper. The ballot paper that came from the HP Industrial Pagewide presses, which is off those massive thousand-pound rolls that Wire Hauser or International Paper ships to them. And then whatever printer paper they were using, which was specified and delivered to them for their ballot on-demand printers if they had to print replacements in the voting centers. Those should have been the only two kinds of paper. I forget if they found 11 or 13 kinds of paper when they did the paper examination. Why did that happen? Our suspicion is it happened because they created the election results they wanted, created the ballot images, which they can do automatically on the machine. That's an output of the adjudication software as it puts out a ballot image that has been amended to show the voter marks that a adjudication has determined whether involved the judge or not. So they imagine that you have a whole server stood up with virtual machines running the scanner software, and they are creating from the cast vote record, ballot images that match the cast vote record for the results that they want. Now you just have to print them. But it's a lot of ballots to print. 2,000,000 ballots is a lot of ballots to print. So if you print them in multiple locations or even in one with whatever paper you've got and that's your, now those are your new ballots that you're going to use as your official record that you then replace whatever ballots you had before. You're going to have a lot of different types of paper, so it might not just be the official ballot printer, it might be whoever's printing ballots that are being used to represent the election results that were predetermined, if that makes sense.

ASG: All right. So we're almost out of time. But I know, Lori, you've had your hand up forever. Go ahead, Laurie, in Texas.

LAURIE: Ohh hey y'all, thank you for everything. No, I was just responding to something else. So we're fighting for the ballots in Texas, the ballot images. There's four states, Florida, Arizona, Texas, and New Jersey, that have lawsuits to restrict the ballot images requested after 60 days. And so our county sued the Attorney General of Texas after he said they had to give him to us. They said no we don't and they've sued him now. So we are battling for records right now and we do have some movement on a Sergeant with the Attorney General's Office going out to a couple counties and investigating some of the ES&S issues. So that's kind of just an update from Texas and great to hear everybody working. Thank you everybody for caring enough to learn and improve our situation. Thank you, Shawn.

SS: Nothing is over until we say it's over. That's how this government works. And they don't believe it now, but they'll believe it when we're done. So don't give up. We don't know how long it's going to take, but we know the outcome in the end. We just gotta flex the Constitution a little bit. Takes a little time.

ASG: That's right. Yeah. Frank, did you have a question? I think feel like your hand was up earlier and I may have screwed up and lowered it, or maybe you changed your mind. I just wanted to make sure we didn't miss you. Nope. OK. Alright. Well, thanks everybody. So looks like we're ending right on time. Thank you Shawn for being here. Do you guys want to continue this discussion next time and bring in E Poll books. Does that sound good?

Great so that will be on Wednesday, January 25th. Alright, thanks for being here everybody. Have a good week.

SS: Sorry, really quick - I didn't realize Rick was on here. Rick Yost is the perfect person to talk to you about the data group.

ASG: Rick is always on here, like faithfully.

SS: Yeah. I didn't even realize or I would have just turned it over to him to talk because he's gonna be more authoritative in terms of talking about what they've researched and data and who the right person is to talk to. But if you can't reach Rick, Jeff Young can connect you or Jeff O'Donnell can connect you or Russ Gal. So all those guys have talked about the SCYTL and Edison data and some of them, you know, focused on it more than others. So but if they can't, if you can't figure out the right person, you know, come back to us and we'll make sure you get connected.

ASG: Perfect. Alright, thanks everybody. Have a great rest of your week.

SS: Take care. Bye.